Rhetoricians usually consider Plato's Republic as a work dedicated to political philosophy. As such, it is ostensibly antidemocratic and thus antirhetorical. But if we focus on the reason for the political allegory—the investigation of justice in the soul—it is clear that Plato is interested in Burke's question: “What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?” Accordingly, this article employs the terms of Burke's pentad in order to articulate the rhetorical significance of Plato's (...) own drama of psychic motivation. Ultimately, I read the degenerating constitutions of the Republic as a rhetorical typography that not only identifies audience types and how to influence them, but also offers a map of psychic transformation that addresses Socrates's famous challenge to rhetoric in the Phaedrus. (shrink)

Abstract.In recent issues of Zygon, numerous reflections have been published commenting on where the field of science‐and‐religion has been, where it presently stands, and where it should move in the future. These reflections touch on the importance of the dialogue and raise questions as to what audience the dialogue addresses and whom it should address. Some scholars see the dialogue as prospering, while others point out that much work needs to be done to make the dialogue more accessible to a (...) larger audience and more successful at tackling the provocative questions before us. Other academics view the questions themselves as needing further consideration and focus before answers to them can even be explored. In this article I provide a general overview of these essays by outlining some general categories of thought that seem to emerge from the contributors. I then present some of my own opinions concerning the future of the science‐religion field and emphasize that the dialogue, in addition to its traditional roles, must further the philosophical framework that can aid humanity in resolving the most pressing global concerns of our time. (shrink)

A significant effect of China’s rejection of a planned economy for a free market is the stimulus this has given to discussion of therelationship between morality and the market. Some Chinese believe that the introduction of a market economy has had a negative effect on public morality. Others disagree and maintain that it has had only a positive effect. Besides this particular debate there are two others. In the first of these debates, it is maintained on the one side that (...) conduct in the market is amoral and essentially contractual or transactional in nature: a boundary must be drawn between economic conduct and conduct in other spheres of social life. Against this it is argued that ethical norms apply equally to all aspects of social life including the economy. In the second debate one side holds that the market engenders its own “ethical” norms. In opposition it is argued that the moral categories articulated in moral philosophy are applicable to behaviour in the market. (shrink)

This chapter explores the term “landscape” and its utility for indigenous people. If indigenous people do not have an understanding of the term, the question is posed whether “landscape” is merely a form of “restricted” speech that is meant to signify power and authority over them and the land they call home. In Australia, certain literary works describe the rich relationship indigenous people have with their land, providing a foundation for the study of “cultural landscapes.” These works share the common (...) trait of presenting a way in which landscape becomes evidence of the cosmological processes that define kinship, group alignments, and cultural practices. (shrink)

This article critically evaluates the conception of conscience underlying the debate about the proper place and role of conscience in the clinical encounter. It suggests that recovering a conception of conscience rooted in the Catholic moral tradition could offer resources for moving the debate past an unproductive assertion of conflicting rights, namely, physicians’ rights to conscience versus patients’ rights to socially and legally sanctioned medical interventions. It proposes that conscience is a necessary component of the moral life in general and (...) a necessary resource for maintaining a coherent sense of moral agency. It demonstrates that an earlier and intellectually richer conception of conscience, in contrast with common contemporary formulations, makes the judgments of conscience accountable to reason, open to critique, and protected from becoming a bastion for bigotry, idiosyncrasy, and personal bias. (shrink)

Do the rich descriptions and narrative shapings of literature provide a valuable resource for readers, writers, philosophers, and everyday people to imagine and confront the ultimate questions of life? Do the human activities of storytelling and complex moral decision-making have a deep connection? What are the moral responsibilities of the artist, critic, and reader? What can religious perspectives—from Catholic to Protestant to Mormon—contribute to literary criticism? Thirty well known contributors reflect on these questions, including iterary theorists Marshall Gregory, James Phelan, (...) and Wayne Booth; philosophers Martha Nussbaum, Richard Hart, and Nina Rosenstand; and authors John Updike, Charles Johnson, Flannery O'Connor, and Bernard Malamud. Divided into four sections, with introductory matter and questions for discussion, this accessible anthology represents the most crucial work today exploring the interdisciplinary connections between literature, religion and philosophy. (shrink)

I have argued that like Harry Frankfurt, Augustine implicitly distinguishes between first-order desires and higher-order volitions; yet unlike Frankfurt, Augustineheld that the liberty to form different possible volitional identifications is essential to responsibility for our character. Like Frankfurt, Augustine recognizes that we can sometimes be responsible for the desires on which we act without being able to do or desire otherwise; but for Augustine, this is true only because such responsibility for inevitable desires and actions traces (at least in part) (...) to responsibility for our volitional identifications, which in turn has leeway-libertarianconditions. However, David Hunt has interpreted Augustine’s account of divine foreknowledge as implying a type of source-incompatibilism that does not require alternative possible actions or intentions. Moreover, while Eleonore Stump’s account of Augustine on sanctification supports my interpretation, Augustine’s position on predestination in his latest writings may be incompatible with liberty of the higher-order will. I will argue against Hunt’s interpretation but admit that the leeway-libertarian has to reject the ‘no autonomy’ model in some of Augustine’s late writings. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls devised the method of reflective equilibrium in an attempt to broker consensus between ethical approaches emphasising individual moral judgements, and those emphasising moral principles, expanding this method in the later paper; “The Independence of Moral Theory”, to produce wide reflective equilibrium. In a number of essays compiled in Justice and Justification, Norman Daniels articulated a more comprehensive version of Rawls's methodology in response to something of a similar struggle within contemporary bioethics, between (...) those bioethical approaches emphasising individual moral judgements, those emphasising bioethical principles and those emphasising bioethical theory; the casuists, the principlists and the descriptivists respectively. In addition to the level of considered moral judgements and that of moral principles that comprise Rawls's reflective equilibrium, Daniels's model proposes a third level of interconnecting background theories in order to incorporate the three dominant strands of contemporary bioethics, to broker consensus between those whose considered moral judgements are in conflict, and to guard against the endpoint of the reflective equilibrium being overly determined by these judgements. However, it is unclear whether his method aids the objectives he set, or whether it in fact hinders them. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Aquinas, Aristotle, and Descriptive Metaphysics Substance and Accident Form, Matter, and Identity Individuation Substance, Causality, and Science Individuals, Universals, and Abstraction Mind and Soul Essence, Existence, and God.

This volume contains papers originally presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during 2005-6. Of the seven colloquia, two deal with topics in Neoplatonism, four are dedicated to Aristotle’s ethics and metaphysics, and one to Plato’s Republic.

Cellular interactions in the mammalian ovarian follicle between its germ‐line and somatic cell components are crucial for its development and function. These interactions are mediated by both membrane gap junctions and paracrine factors. Somatic cell‐to‐oocyte communication is essential for oocyte growth and the regulation of meiotic maturation. In particular, granulosa cells provide nutrients and molecular signals that regulate oocyte development. Oocytes, on the other hand, promote the organization of the follicle, the proliferation of granulosa cells, and the differentiation and function (...) of cumulus cells, a subset of granulosa cells. Determining the nature of the oocyte‐to‐granulosa cell signals remains a key challenge for future work. (shrink)

This essay explores the resources and limits of pragmatism in a world marked by violence, war, and terrorism. After explicating major strengths of pragmatic social philosophy as developed in the work of John Dewey, I consider two important criticisms of this view as formulated by Randolph Bourne in the face of Dewey's support for American entry into World War I. Bourne first charged that pragmatism is a fair‐weather philosophy ineffective in deliberations among persons who do not already share its (...) principal values of freedom, individuality, education, community, and democracy. I argue that Bourne is correct, but that this does not mark a theoretical weakness or failure of pragmatism: Pragmatism has a real but limited practical value or sphere of effectiveness; it cannot do certain kinds of work in times of war (which it should oppose) and it cannot do certain kinds of work in the face of a certain kind of pluralism (which it should more fully embrace). Bourne's second charge against pragmatists is that too often they miss opportunities and waste time. Here I claim that Bourne is correct, and that his point directs pragmatists to turn away from efforts to make pragmatism better in theory and instead to engage in efforts to make practice more intelligent—something Bourne characterized as a “new Americanism” of “federated ethnic groups and traditions,” a genuine alternative to military coalition, “war in the service of democracy.” I close by outlining four such projects. (shrink)

A few years ago philosophy of mind in the main English-language tradition was characterized by marked optimism about progress and by broad agreement that a correct theory would be a version of physicalism that admitted the sui generis nature of psychological descriptions and explanations. Now consensus seems to have given way to chaos supervenient physicalism has become so weak as to be virtually contentless and reductionism has become no more plausible than when it was generally rejected. The essay presses these (...) points and suggests the need of more radical alternatives. (shrink)

I am really quite honored to have a chance to be here. Also let me say how much I appreciate what all of you public health professionals do. One of the unfortunate dimensions of modern American life is that we have chosen to privatize all aspects of life. People do not live on their front porches anymore and watch their neighbors in the evening. They go out back in their wall-enclosed backyards. And we have done the same with medicine.Medicine has (...) been privatized in America. We have lost a sense of the public obligations of health and hygiene and sanitation. So I thank you for keeping the flame alive on what we clearly now know is the far bigger issue of health care in modern society. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, it is argued that Popper’s understanding of Plato’s notion of freedom is fundamentally flawed because he begins with the unexamined assumptions of modern liberalism. Subsequently, in the second section, it is shown through philological analysis that the ancient notion of freedom must be understood primarily in terms of a social and political condition that is the opposite of slavery or of living under a tyranny. Finally, the third section of the paper considers Plato’s (...) criticism of the demotic notion of freedom, as well as the dialectical strategy through which he subsumes it under his aristocratic ideal of freedom as rational self-control. (shrink)

This volume contains papers and commentaries originally presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during the 2004-5 academic year. Of the seven colloquia in the volume, two deal with Plato while the rest are dedicated to Aristotle.

Two Short Communications:R. A. Markus, Gregory the Great and In I Regum, by Francis ClarkAquinas's Claim ‘Anima Mea Non Est Ego’, by Stephen Priest.

This remarkable reconstruction of Søren Kierkegaard's work based on a reading of original Danish sources could have been entitled Phenomenology of Spirit or, perhaps, Itinerarium Cordis Ad Deum. In ten chapters it attempts to uncover SK's ethico-religious understanding of the humanjourney towards the transcendent God. It is a journey away from speculative absorption in nature and universal history, away from the hubris of poetical self-creation, away even from ethical awareness of the universally human and a kind of Pelagian self-confidence in (...) one's ability to do the good. Thejourney ends with the recognition of one's own powerlessness and nothingness—a recognition that can lead either to prideful despair or to humble faith. (shrink)